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The Temptation of Martinez v. Ryan:
Legal Ethics for the Habeas Bar1
Lawrence Kornreich & Alexander I. Platt
I. Introduction

I

n Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court opened a new
route for convicted defendants to obtain habeas relief.2
A defendant whose first-tier state habeas counsel failed
to adequately challenge the ineffectiveness of his trial
counsel— in jurisdictions where that is the first opportunity to
do so—will now be able to raise that ineffectiveness claim in a
subsequent federal habeas proceeding.3 Martinez allows a federal habeas petitioner to avoid
losing this claim through procedural default if he successfully
asserts that (1) the ineffectiveness of his state habeas counsel
was the “cause”4 of his failure
to raise the ineffectiveness of
his trial counsel during first-tier
state post-conviction proceedings, and (2) his trial counsel
was, in fact, ineffective under
Strickland v. Washington. 5
Though the Court did not
recognize a constitutional right
to effective counsel on collateral review, it ensured that ineffective
state habeas counsel would not prevent a defendant from raising
claims about constitutionally ineffective trial counsel on federal
collateral review.6
By introducing a new category of eligible claims reviewable
in federal habeas proceedings, however, the Court also introduced
a new and difficult choice for certain convicted defendants as
their cases move along the procedural path from state to federal
habeas review.7 Because many habeas lawyers represent their
clients across both state and federal habeas proceedings,8 and
because these lawyers must adhere to ethical rules that prohibit
conflicts of interest in their representation,9 many clients in
Martinez’s position will be forced to choose whether (a) to retain
their state habeas counsel through subsequent post-conviction
appeals and forego a possible Martinez claim, or (b) to pursue
a federal habeas Martinez claim with new counsel.10 With this
choice for habeas litigants come important and difficult ethical
questions for the habeas bar: Is it possible to advise a client
regarding a claim based on one’s own ineffectiveness without
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committing an ethics violation? Can a client provide informed
consent with respect to his lawyer’s conflict in order to receive
the lawyer’s advice about making this choice, or is it necessary
to bring in outside counsel to advise the client?
To a habeas bar already burdened by extreme resource
scarcity and exacting procedural and timing requirements,
Martinez adds yet another potential source of friction between
effective representation and professional ethical responsibilities.
Due to the additional costs entailed in complying with ethical
standards, individual lawyers
and those who set the rules that
govern them may be tempted to
loosen these rules in the name of
access to justice.11 This would
be a mistake. To preserve the
integrity and autonomy of the
legal profession, this temptation
must be resisted.12
This Article aims to alert
the habeas bar to the ethical
responsibilities implicated
by the Martinez decision and
to provide guidance for what
counsel must do when presented with Martinez situations to comply with professional
ethical obligations. It proceeds in three parts. Part II reviews
Martinez and the new category of claims that convicted defendants may now bring on federal habeas review. Part III explores
the two conflicts of interest created by the Martinez decision.
It shows the reach of these conflicts by surveying the structure
of the habeas bar and relates these conflicts to similar ones that
exist at other procedural stages in criminal defense. Part IV suggests steps that habeas counsel should take to comply with their
ethical obligations in light of these conflicts.

II. Raising Ineffective-AssistanceClaims in Federal Habeas
After Martinez

of-Trial-Counsel

A federal judge may not issue a writ of habeas corpus freeing a state prisoner “if an adequate and independent state-law
1

ground justifies the prisoner’s detention.”13 “One ‘state ground’
often asserted,” in justifying detention is “a state-law ‘procedural
default,’ such as the prisoner’s failure to raise his federal claim
at the proper time.”14 However, the state court’s assertion of a procedural ground for default does not bar the assertion of the federal
claim “where the prisoner had good ‘cause’ for not following the
state procedural rule and was ‘prejudiced’ by not having done so.”15
In Murray v. Carrier, the Court determined that a lawyer’s
constitutionally inadequate performance on direct appeal could
amount to a cause sufficient to overcome a procedural default.16
But in Coleman v. Thompson, the Court found that since “[t]here
is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings . . . a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.”17 That opinion
concluded, therefore, that a habeas lawyer’s error in post-conviction proceedings, even one that were to fall below the Strickland
standard, could never be constitutionally ineffective.18
Martinez carved out an exception to Coleman.19 Where
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims relating to counsel’s conduct during trial or direct appeal can only initially
be brought in state habeas proceedings, lawyer error in those
state habeas proceedings can now constitute cause, excusing a
procedural default.20 Martinez applies only to claims that could
not be raised prior to an “initial-review collateral proceeding.”21
With respect to such claims, if either (1) the state courts did not
appoint counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, or
(2) the appointed counsel was ineffective under the Strickland
standard,22 then a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing those claims.23
“To overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate
that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim
is . . . substantial.”24 In response, the state can raise the defense
that the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is “wholly
without factual support, or that the lawyer in the initial-review
collateral proceeding did not perform below constitutional standards.”25 The Martinez majority insisted, over Justice Scalia’s
objections,26 that its decision did not establish a constitutional
right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.27 Rather, in the
majority’s view, a state can either provide effective counsel in
initial-review collateral proceedings or give up its procedural
default defense in federal habeas.28
Martinez opens up a new category of claims for prisoners
seeking collateral relief. The next part begins to examine the
ethical implications of this development.

III. Martinez’s Two Conflicts of Interest
Imagine the following scenario. Lawyer “L” routinely
represents clients on collateral review across both state and
federal habeas proceedings. L represents a client who
2

recently lost on his initial-review collateral proceeding. In that
proceeding, L did not raise any claim regarding the constitutional ineffectiveness of her client’s trial counsel (“TC”). L is
now preparing for federal habeas proceedings. Under Martinez,
L may still obtain federal collateral relief based on the constitutional ineffectiveness of TC by asserting that she was ineffective
by failing to raise the claim on the initial-review proceeding,
thereby avoiding procedural default.29
Martinez’s innovation is likely to be warmly received
by those eager to see habeas clients add a new procedural
arrow to their quivers.30 But the opinion also introduces a new
dilemma for these litigants and their counsel—one that has
gone unrecognized until now. A client in this situation now
faces an extremely difficult decision about the next phase of his
representation. He may either (a) find new counsel to pursue
a Martinez claim in federal court based on L’s ineffectiveness
in state habeas proceedings, or (b) keep L on as his lawyer and
abandon his Martinez claim.
This choice is unavoidable because L cannot argue her
own ineffectiveness without facing an unwaivable conflict of
interest.31 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide
that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest.”32 A conflict exists
where “there is a significant risk that the representation . . .
will be materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer.”33
A lawyer has a personal interest in not being found to have
performed ineffectively and in preserving her reputation as
an effective practitioner. That interest, by definition, conflicts
with the interests of a client asserting a claim based on his
habeas lawyer’s prior ineffectiveness. As the comment to the
Rule explains, “[I]f the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct
in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or
impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.”34
Accordingly, many jurisdictions have held that a lawyer who
enters representation in which she might be obliged to assert
her own ineffectiveness necessarily encounters a conflict
of interest.35
A strong presumption of a conflicted representation in
this context is reinforced by the reality that a lawyer is simply
“unlikely to raise a challenge to his or her own effectiveness.”36
As one commentator/practitioner noted, lawyers are unlikely to
embrace allegations of their own ineffectiveness because “[b]
eing second-guessed is not pleasant, and the impulse to defend
one’s self is all too human.”37
Of course, “unlikely” is not synonymous with “never.”
There are undoubtedly examples of dedicated defense counsel vigorously pursuing their clients’ best interests by asserting their own prior ineffectiveness. It may even be the
case that trial counsel has an ethical obligation to ensure that
her present client will later be able to raise the best possible
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ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim by documenting all
strategic choices in the course of the representation.38
However, the ethical rule against conflicted representation
reflects a deeper concern. Unlike “other ethical or representational failures, which are discrete and whose effects are manifest
and readily measured, a conflict of interest casts a shadow over
every aspect of the lawyer-client relationship.”39 Even where
a selfless counsel does assert her own prior ineffectiveness on
behalf of a client, her conflict of interest with respect to this
claim may still affect the quality of her advocacy on behalf of
that claim. It might lead her to pay more attention to alternative claims or to pursue the claim with less zealousness. These
effects are hard to measure. As the Supreme Court stated, the
“evil” posed by conflicted representation is “in what the advocate finds himself compelled to
refrain from doing . . . [a]nd to
assess the impact of a conflict
of interests on the attorney’s
options, tactics, and decisions . . . would be virtually
impossible.”40 This rationale
is echoed by the Restatement
(Third) of Law Governing
Law, which notes that “[e]ven
if a lawyer could subordinate
significant personal interests
to the interests of clients, it
is difficult to determine after
the fact whether a lawyer had
succeeded in keeping a client’s
interests foremost.”41 Because
of the difficulty in finding
concrete evidence of conflicted
behavior, a broad prophylactic
rule against conflicted representation is necessary to ensure that a “lawyer’s own interests
[are] not . . . permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.”42
Many jurisdictions have gone so far to hold that the conflict
extends to situations where a different lawyer from the same
office is faced with the possibility of raising an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim about her colleague.43 Under these
principles, if L’s client wanted to pursue a Martinez claim, L
would face a conflict of interest in advocating that claim and so
would any firm colleague of L.44
In fact, the conflict extends even further: not only would
it affect L’s ability to litigate her client’s Martinez claim in
federal court based on her own ineffectiveness on state habeas,
but it would also affect L’s ability to advise her client about
making the choice about how to proceed.45 L’s personal interest
in not being found ineffective means that she cannot provide

conflict-free advice to her client about whether or not to pursue
a Martinez claim.
For example, as one commentator argues, when a client
approaches her former trial counsel for advice regarding a pro
se habeas petition involving an ineffective assistance claim
regarding the trial counsel’s own conduct, that lawyer “should
refrain from giving any legal advice other than the advice to
obtain counsel.”46 A parallel conflict arises after Martinez for
state habeas counsel and their clients.
Martinez presents client and counsel with serious obstacles
stemming from two conflicts of interest: (1) a conflict with
respect to any Martinez claim based on the lawyer’s own ineffectiveness; and (2) a conflict with respect to any advice to her
client as to whether he should or should not pursue that claim.
Before turning to examine
what ethical obligations follow, this Article briefly pauses
to consider two points: (1) how
these conflicts will actually
arise in habeas litigation; and
(2) the relationship to similar
conflicts at other stages of
criminal defense litigation.
On the first point, despite
the paucity of statistical data
on the subject, it is likely that
a substantial subset of habeas
lawyers—and their clients—
will confront the ethical
dilemma outlined above. The
habeas bar is comprised of
court-appointed and privately
retained lawyers. 47 Though
most federal habeas petitions
proceeded without any coun48
sel, the first major study of federal habeas cases since the
Antiterorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was
enacted found that capital petitioners are substantially more
likely to have counsel than non-capital petitioners,49 and
that for both capital and non-capital cases, habeas counsel is
comprised of a mixture of both court-appointed and privately
retained counsel.50 Over the last several decades, a robust
private bar comprised of law-firm pro-bono,51 specialized
non-profits,52 and legal clinics53 have taken on representation
of many capital defendants in both state and federal postconviction proceedings. Court-appointed lawyers may be
more likely to practice only in one venue and only as long as
their court-appointment lasts. In contrast, this private pro-bono
bar frequently represents clients across both state and federal
habeas claims because continuity of representation is regarded
as valuable to both client and counsel.54

In fact, the conflict extends even
further: not only would it affect

L’s ability to litigate her client’s
Martinez claim in federal court

based on her own ineffectiveness

on state habeas, but it would also
affect L’s ability to advise her

client about making the choice
about how to proceed.
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Unfortunately, anything more than anecdotal support as to
the prevalence of cross-systemic habeas representation is difficult, not only because of the lack of data, but because the practices and composition of any particular habeas bar depends on
highly localized factors. These factors include, legal rules about
whether and which petitioners are entitled to court-appointed
counsel,55 or institutional factors such as whether a local public
defender offers habeas representation.56 But no further specificity is necessary. Some subset of habeas counsel will find itself
facing the ethical dilemma created by Martinez. This article
provides ethics advice for this subset.
On the second point, while the conflicts raised by Martinez
are new to this stage of the procedural posture, they are not
altogether new to criminal defense. In jurisdictions where
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims may be raised initially
on direct appeal, or in post-trial motions, trial counsel and client
have long faced a similar dilemma. 57 Indeed, all of the case law
previously cited for the proposition that a lawyer cannot argue
his own ineffectiveness comes out of such cases.58
The conflicts created by Martinez are nonetheless worthy
of attention for two reasons. First, flagging the conflict will help
lawyers avoid being caught by surprise. Without notice of the
post-Martinez ethical landscape, lawyers may engage in unintentional ethical violations. While jurisdictions have developed
case law and practices regarding conflicts on direct appeals,59
the novelty of the Martinez conflict generates a risk that lawyers will fail to pay attention to their ethical obligations unless
they are made aware of the conflicts the case presents. Second,
the novelty of the conflicts creates an opportunity to develop
practices and rules that conform to ethical professional values,
rather than merely the strong pull of on-the-ground realities. By
drawing attention to this conflict in the immediate aftermath
of the Martinez decision, before rules or practices have taken
hold, this article hopes to help shape the development of those
practices around an awareness of the conflict and a respect for
the ethical duties of counsel.
With this framework in mind, the next part turns to provide
ethics advice to the subset of habeas lawyers that is likely to
face this new conflict in the post-Martinez era.

IV. Recommendations to the Bar
The Model Rules allow representation to go forward despite conflicts of interest, but this does not resolve the ethical
dilemma framed by Martinez. The Rules distinguish between
waivable and unwaivable conflicts.60 Rule 1.7(b) provides that
a conflicted lawyer may still represent a client if “the lawyer
reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation,” “the representation is not
prohibited by law,” and “[the] client gives informed consent,
4

confirmed in writing.”61 Any lawyer who finds herself in L’s
position should proceed by asking herself whether these requirements can be met in her situation.
The first conflict is the question of whether the lawyer can
proceed to actually litigate the Martinez claim based on her own
prior ineffectiveness by obtaining informed written consent of
her client. Some jurisdictions seem to have explicitly prohibited
such representation, recognizing it as a per se prejudicial conflict.62 In those jurisdictions the conflict would be unwaivable
since it is “prohibited by law.”63
But, absent such express prohibition—or in those jurisdictions where it is ambiguous64—would it be possible for a
lawyer to “reasonably believe[] that [she] will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation” despite the conflict?65
We believe the answer should be no. As discussed above,
even if a lawyer might proceed with a claim based on her own
ineffectiveness, courts have recognized reasons to suspect that
she would not pursue that claim as vigorously, or might devote
more attention to alternative claims.66 Because of these difficulties in monitoring the representation and the fundamental
nature of the conflict of interest, it is unreasonable to think that
a lawyer will be able to assess her own errors and argue that her
actions fell below the objective standard of reasonableness.67
Insofar as a lawyer cannot competently and diligently
advance an argument based on her own ineffectiveness, what
should the lawyer do about the second conflict: how to advise
the client regarding the choice he now faces between retaining
counsel and abandoning the Martinez claim, or pursuing the
claim with new counsel?
Because the lawyer is conflicted in this situation, once
again, the question is whether she can “reasonably believe”
that she will be able to provide “competent and diligent representation” in the course of providing the advice. If so, then
she may counsel her client about this choice after obtaining
informed written consent.68 If not, then she must bring in outside
counsel to provide this advice and can only continue with the
non-Martinez representation in federal habeas after her client
makes an informed decision to abandon that claim on the basis
of consultation with outside counsel.69
Again, the answer should be no—and for similar reasons.
For professional or reputational reasons, it is unlikely that a
lawyer would be able to provide detached and unbiased advice
regarding a claim based on her own inadequacy. Due to the fundamental nature of this conflict, it is not possible for a lawyer to
“reasonably believe” that she will be able to provide “competent
and diligent representation.”70 Thus, she should bring in outside
counsel to review the record and advise the client about whether
to pursue this claim.71
To summarize: After Martinez, when a lawyer fails to
completely raise a possible ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim on first-tier collateral proceedings (i.e., she was arguably
Fall 2012

ineffective), she has an ethical obligation to bring in outside
counsel to review the record below and advise her client regarding
the merits of such a claim. And, if her client chooses to go forward with this Martinez claim, he must use new counsel to do so.

V. Conclusion: The Temptation of Martinez
Even though Martinez adds an arrow to the quiver of convicted defendants seeking collateral relief, it also introduces
new difficulties for both the habeas bar and its clients.
Martinez, therefore, has the perhaps surprising consequence
of imposing substantial new burdens on habeas counsel and on
habeas petitioners themselves. Significant time and money must
be spent on bringing in a lawyer to review the record and advise
the client as to his choices. Time and money which might have
been spent litigating claims must be devoted to ensuring clients
receive conflict-free representation. Even as Martinez opened
one door to federal habeas, it may have closed another.
To a habeas bar already burdened by extreme professional
challenges owing to a lack of resources, a maze of onerous
and rigid procedural hurdles, and incarcerated clients who are
often difficult to reach, the Martinez decision adds an additional
professional obligation. To an already disempowered and vulnerable clientele of habeas petitioners, Martinez poses a new
and potentially troubling dilemma regarding the future course
of their representation: give up your current habeas counsel and
try to find a new lawyer in the hopes of raising a new claim in
federal court, or continue with the current relationship at the
cost of foregoing that potential claim.
These dilemmas are difficult for both counsel and client.
They add new pressure on the system of habeas representation
and may create a temptation to loosen the ethical obligations
in the name of enhancing access to justice—both by practicing
lawyers and by those who set the rules that govern them.
Lawyers should resist this temptation. The ethical
obligations imposed on lawyers should not be sacrificed
for enhanced efficiency. These obligations serve deeper values.
Compromising on professional ethical responsibilities would
undercut lawyers’ tradition of self-regulation, and with it, the
important values served by an independent legal profession.
As the Preamble to the Model Rules explains:
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their
professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain
the legal profession’s independence from government
domination. An independent legal profession is an
important force in preserving government under law,
for abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged
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by a profession whose members are not dependent on
government for the right to practice.72
Even as the ethical challenges of habeas proceedings grow
more complex, lawyers have a duty to continue to provide zealous
representation—bearing in mind that whatever the procedural
changes, for their clients, the stakes remain as high as ever.

Thanks to Professor Lawrence J. Fox and our colleagues in the Ethics
Bureau at Yale. This Article is intended to bring a serious but heretofore
unrecognized ethical issue to the attention of the habeas bar. It is not
intended to provide specific legal or ethics advice for habeas lawyers.
Lawyers unsure about the boundaries of their ethical responsibilities should
review the applicable law and rules or contact professional responsibility
counsel for specific advice. Please send comments to alex.i.platt@gmail.com.
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35
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State, 657 S.E.2d 842, 844-45 (Ga. 2008) (holding that the trial court’s
refusal to appoint new appellate counsel to a defendant who wanted to
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